If public funds are aHocated efficiently, then an increase in funding should improve the performance of substance abuse treatment programs. In the data used in this paper, performance (measured as abstinence rates) and expenditures per patient are not positively correlated. One explanation is that funding is endogeneous, i.e. programs treating more difficult patients receive more funding. The data comes from aH Maine's outpatient drug-free prograrns that received public funding between 1991 and 1994. After controlling for endogeneity, this paper concludes that the marginal impact of expenditures per patient on abstinence rates is small and statistically insignificantly different from zero.
Introduction
Substance abuse treatment started receiving major funding from the US Federal Government around 1965 duríng the opioid epidemic of the 1960s. Since then, state governments as well as prívate sources have also contríbuted to the financing of these prügrams. Estimates for 1985 1 say that 64% of the direct health costs from drug abuse was supported by state, federal, or local funds. With the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 the Federal Government increased its funding for substance abuse treatment substantially.2 Despite the growth in
Substance abuse treatment started receiving major funding from the US Federal Government around 1965 duríng the opioid epidemic of the 1960s. Since then, state governments as well as prívate sources have also contríbuted to the financing of these prügrams. Estimates for 1985 1 say that 64% of the direct health costs from drug abuse was supported by state, federal, or local funds. With the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 the Federal Government increased its funding for substance abuse treatment substantially.2 Despite the growth in public funding, little is known about the cost-effectiveness of these programs. In this paper, the marginal impact of public funds on the abstinence rate of substance abuse (mainly alcohol abuse) outpatient drug-free treatment programs in the state of Maine from 1991 to 1994 is estimated.
The main motivation for this paper comes from the puzzling observation that the unconditional correlation between performance of treatment programs and expenditures per patient is non-positive in our dataset. If this anecdotal evidence proves to be generally true, the state of Maine would be better off transferring funds from alcohol abuse treatment 3 to other social programs.
A closer look at the allocation process of state and federal funds across providers of alcohol abuse treatment in Maine suggests that expenditures per patient are potentially endogenous. Funds are allocated in a centralized fashion by the Maine Office of Substance Abuse (OSA). Moreover, OSA collects very detailed information on patients' characteristics and performance at the patient level for every treatment agency. The use of this information in OSA's allocation decision is the potential source of endogeneity and may explain the non-positive unconditional correlation between expenditures per patient and treatment outcomes. For instance, if OSA allocates more funds per patient to those programs with more difficult patients, and we do not control for patient characteristics, then the estimated impact of funds on outcomes would be biased downwards. In this paper, instrumental variables (IV) are used to avoid this potential endogeneity bias.
The literature on treatment effectiveness has presented evidence (although many studies suffer methodological flaws 4 ) that patients tend to do better after treatment. in a review of effectiveness studies conclude that the "data reviewed (from controlled clinical trials or real-world settings) indicate that substance-abuse patients show major reduction in their alcohol and drug use following their treatment" as well as improvement in medical, psychological functioning, and other components of quality of life. From the point of view of a policy maker who has an interest in getting the most out of every dollar spent, effectiveness of alcohol abuse treatment is certainly a necessary condition for continuing public funding. Nevertheless, as McLellan et al. point out, their review "has also shown substantial variability in effectiveness of substance abuse treatment across different settings, modalities, and programs. Put simply, not all programs are effective".
Even if treatment, in general, proves to be effective, there is still scope for waste in the way public funds are being used. Waste may be caused by abad allocation of public funds: programs that are not effective being funded, or effective programs being over-funded and spending the excess dollars in activities that do not contribute to the patients' recovery.
Cost-effectiveness studies, relating funds and outcomes, are rare, and do not always use multivariate regression analysis. The effect of funds on the performance of substance abuse treatment has been typically linked to the debate surrounding the choice of a less expensive outpatient treatment versus a more expensive inpatient treatment . This paper sets out to analyze exclusively outpatient public funding, little is known about the cost-effectiveness of these programs. In this paper, the marginal impact of public funds on the abstinence rate of substance abuse (mainly alcohol abuse) outpatient drug-free treatment programs in the state of Maine from 1991 to 1994 is estimated.
Cost-effectiveness studies, relating funds and outcomes, are rare, and do not always use multivariate regression analysis. The effect of funds on the performance of substance abuse treatment has been typically linked to the debate surrounding the choice of a less expensive outpatient treatment versus a more expensive inpatient treatment . This paper sets out to analyze exclusively outpatient treatment programs, and estimate the marginal impact of expenditures per patient on their abstinence rateo
It is perhaps useful to draw sorne evidence of the relationship between performance and funding from other social programs. In particular, the earlier construction of standardized performance measures for students in the US has allowed a large number of such studies in the education field . Aggregate data show that spending per pupil has been growing steadily since 1890, while average student performance has not increased and has actually worsened since 1967 . The study Equality oi Educational Opportunity conc1uded that student background was the major predictor of student performance whi1e expenditures per student as well as other schoo1 inputs had no measurable impact. Researchers have not yet reached a consensus regarding the effect of funds on performance due to differences in the degree of data aggregation , the measurement of teacher's quality (Ferguson, 1991; , and the treatment of endogenous expenditures (Lang and Somanathan, 1997) . Like public schools, non-profit providers of alcohol abuse treatment are heavily financed by the federal and state governments, and are given great discretion in the use of their funding. This paper' s main conclusion is that the marginal impact of expenditures per patient is economically small and statistically not different from zero. The most optimistic estimation implies that, on an average, it would cost US$ 615,801.80 to produce an extra abstinent patient in Maine.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 characterizes the background of the study, Section 3 derives the estimation model, Section 4 describes the dataset, Section 5 shows the estimation results, Section 6 discusses the assumptions and caveats and finally, Section 7 conc1udes.
Maine's substance abuse treatment system
In 1988 the state ofMaine spent US$ 7,304,928.00 on substance abuse treatment programs (mainly alcohol abuse) and this total has grown to US$ 10,085,716.00 by 1995. The size of these numbers and the fact that close to 1 % of the state' s population has received treatment from public programs has led the authorities to adopt two important measures to monitor the supply of treatment services. Firstly, in October 1989, the Maine Addiction and Treatment System (MATS) was introduced. Secondly, in fiscal year 1993, performance incentives were introduced in the contracts signed with treatment agencies. Both measures have received wide attention from state authorities throughout the USo MATS consists of the requirement for all agencies receiving any public funding to fill out a standard admission and discharge form for each person who is treated for substance abuse related problems and to submit these forms to the relevant authority (after July 1990, the Office of Substance Abuse (OSA)). These forms give detailed information about each treatment program at the patient level. 5 5 See Commons el al. (1997) or Cornmons el al. (1994) for a descriplion. treatment programs, and estimate the marginal impact of expenditures per patient on their abstinence rateo
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In July 1991,6 OSA added performance standards to its contracts. Programs were supposed to meet these standard s although no penalty existed in case of non-compliance. In the fiscal year 1993, however, OSA changed its contracts in an attempt to introduce incentives. These new contracts stated that "allocation of resources for the (next) contract year may be affected by agency performance in the previous year". 7 According to , "to date, OSA has not found it possible to reward good performers by allowing them to retain surplus funds, due to legislative reduction in appropriations occurring as a result of Maine' s current economic situation". Occasionally, however, good performers received OSA's recommendation for additional federal funding and poor performers were put on a fee-for-service ancI/or shorter contracts. These compensations and penalties were not explicitly stated in the contract and therefore we make the simplifying assumption that implicit incentives are non existent. 8 OSA measured program performance in three categories: efficiency, effectiveness, and special populations. Efficiency was related to the degree of compliance in the provis ion of the amount of services contracted with OSA. Effectiveness and special populations were disaggregated into a set of specific indicators with their own standards and were measured for primary c1ients only.9 Effectiveness intended to measure the quality of the services provided. Its indicators were obtained from the comparison of discharge and admission MATS data on every single patient and aggregated at the programquarter level. Outpatient treatment programs had to satisfy at least 8 out of 12 indicators in order to perform on Effectiveness. The "percentage of abstinent patients 30 days prior to discharge" is one of these indicators which should reach at least 70%. 10 Finally, special populations intended to control for patient selection by guaranteeing that certain groups in the society (e.g. the elderly) received a given share of treatment.
Besides managing the data collection process, OSA was responsible for the allocation of state appropriations and federal block grants across non-profit substance abuse treatment agencies. The allocation of funds before PBC followed a historical pattern meaning that each year's allocation was based on the previous year's. Nevertheless, there is no strong evidence that PBC changed the historical rules of funding allocation dramatically ). OSA's contract with the agencies established the amount OSA was assigning and its distribution across different pro- 6 Beginning of fiscal year 1992. From now on aH references to a year mean fiscal year.
7 This is called "performance-based contracting" (PBC).
8 mn linear regressions of abstinence rates and a few covariates, among them a dummy variable lhat takes value O before PBC was first introduced and value l afterwards. The aulhors find a positive and significant impact of lhe PBC dummy although they recognize lhat the PBC effect cannot be distinguished from a shift in the trend. We have introduced time dummies as explanatory variables in our estimations and we concluded that, after controHing for a much wider and different vector of program and discharged patient characteristics (including fixed effects) and restricting ourselves to outpatient programs, the impact of time dummies on abstinence rates was not significantly different from zero. The results of these "informal tests" are not presented in this papero 9 Clients are either primary clients or "patients" (the ones who need treatment) or co-dependents of primary clients. 10 Notice that patients may be discharged either because they have completed treatment, or because they are referred to another treatment program, or even because they dropped out of treatmen!.
grams (e.g. detoxification, outpatient treatment, and residential treatment) within the same contract. 11 The effort put into reforming the supply of alcohol abuse treatment shows the importance that the state of Maine attaches to these social programs, and the relevance of the question that this paper addresses, i.e. the impact of the marginal dollar on the performance of treatment programs.
The estimation model
We have in mind a model where the unit of analysis is the outpatient program i, i 1, ... ,n. Every quarter t, program i provides treatment to Nit patients. At the end of the quarter, Dit (O :s Dit :s Nit) patients are discharged from treatment. We as sume that all the patients discharged from program i in quarter t have the same probability Pi t of performing successfully. We model Pit as a logistic function of expenditures per patient, Cit, program and average discharged patient characteristics represented by the vector <t' and managerial effort or c1inic specific productivity mi, as follows:
In Eq. O) O-is a constant term, and the total expenditures per patient Cit -Cit! Nit == Xit/Nit + Oit/Nit come partly from aSA's contribution (Xit), and partly from third party donations (Oit).
The assumption of a common probability of success for discharged patients implies that the total number of successes from program i in period t (fit) follows a binomial distribution with parameters (Pit, Dit). The range of values for fit E [O, Dit] is consistent with the frequency of zero successes and al! successes that we observe in the data. In short, we interpret Pit as a reduced form production function where the output (the realized number of abstinent discharges) follows a random process and funds are used optimally in the acquisition of inputs, such as qualified staff.
From the consistent estimation of Eq. O) we derive an estimate of the marginal impact of funds per capita on performance, given by
OCit (2)
In order to obtain consistent parameter estimates we must deal with the possibility of omitted variables that cause Cit to be endogenous. There are two good reasons to suspect that funding may be endogenous. First, funding decisions are made in a centralized fashion by a well informed decision maker, OSA. And second, as Figs. 1 and 2 show, 12 the unconditional correlation between expenditures per patient and abstinence rates is non-positive in the data.
11 Interestingly the state does not support methadone maintenance programs despite their relative success (see . Each program within the same contract is separately evaluated in terms of performance. 12 In these pictures we use two alternative definitions of expenditures per patient defined later in the paper.
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OCit (2)
In order to obtain consistent parameter estimates we must deal with the possibility of omitted variables that cause Cit to be endogenous. There are two good reasons to suspect that funding may be endogenous. First, funding decisions are made in a centralized fashion by a well informed decision maker, OSA. And second, as Figs. 1 and 2 show, 12 the unconditional correlation between expenditures per patient and abstinence rates is non-positive in the data. A non-linear maximum likelihood estimation presents two problems. First, while the managerial effort mi is not observable to the econometrician, it is likely to be observed by OSA officials due to a long-term relationship with these agencies. OSA is likely to take mi into consideration when deciding on the aHocation to agency i, in which case Cit is correlated with mi and therefore, an endogenous variable. The omission of relevant variables correlated with Cit such as mi, would yield biased estimates of C/. Second, we might think that the problem of unobserved managerial effort mi is solved with the introduction of fixed effects in its place. The introduction of fixed effects in a non-linear model, however, causes inconsistent estimates. Consistency requires the number of observations per agency to grow to infinity. 14 Hence, fixed effects may eliminate the endogeneity bias at the expense of an estimation bias.
A linear model has the advantage of both avoiding the inconsistency caused by the introduction of fixed effects and of dealing with any remaining endogeneity through the use of instrumental variables estimation. Before linearizing Eq. (1) replace the managerial effort variable mi by a fixed effect parameter ki to be estimated, and introduce an error term eit representing aH time-variant omitted variables. The probability of success now takes the form
The linearization of Eq. (3) hinges on three basic steps: (1) the use of the equality Yit/dit= Pit + Uit, where Yit/dit is the realized success rate, and Uit is an error term with E(Uit) = O, (2) the inversion of the logistic function and (3) a first-order linear approximation around Uit = O. The resulting linear equation is the basic equation that we will estimate using quarterly data on abstinence rates per outpatient program, and is given by
where r¡it is a heteroscedastic error term with the following properties:
13 Assuming that observations are independent across programs and time, the likelihood function is
where e;;;
is the combinatorial term of tbe realized number of discharges di t by the realized number of successes Yit. Maximum likelihood results, not shown in this paper, can be found in .
14 Andersen (1973) and show inconsistency for tbe maximum likelihood logit estimator. Machado (1997, Chapter 7) derives a consistent estimator for the binomial distribution witb a logistic probability of success in the presence of fixed effects. The latter estimator, however, demands a lot of computer time and is bes! used for smaller datasets.
Eq.
(1) can be estimated foHowing two approaches: a non-linear maximum likelihood estimation based on the binomial distribution 13 and a non-maximum likelihood estimation of a linear version of Eq. (1).
A non-linear maximum likelihood estimation presents two problems. First, while the managerial effort mi is not observable to the econometrician, it is likely to be observed by OSA officials due to a long-term relationship with these agencies. OSA is likely to take mi into consideration when deciding on the aHocation to agency i, in which case Cit is correlated with mi and therefore, an endogenous variable. The omission of relevant variables correlated with Cit such as mi, would yield biased estimates of C/. Second, we might think that the problem of unobserved managerial effort mi is solved with the introduction of fixed effects in its place. The introduction of fixed effects in a non-linear model, however, causes inconsistent estimates. Consistency requires the number of observations per agency to grow to infinity. 14 Hence, fixed effects may eliminate the endogeneity bias at the expense of an estimation bias.
Var(Uit)
Lastly, we must point out that in spite of its advantages over the non-linear model, the linear model (4) is incompatible with O or 100% success rates (y¡t/dit = {O, l}). In our dataset,
Yit/dit attains zero in 1.7% ofthe observations and it attains 1 in 10% ofthe observations. 15 We apply the standard procedure of approximating the values of 1 with 0.999 and of O with 0.001. 16 Next, we motivate the possibility of endogenous funding with a simple model where a central manager/planner allocates scarce resources to a given number of plants/agencies. The model shows that, under certain reasonable assumptions, a planner would optimally choose to compensate agencies with lower exogenous productivity by increasing their amount of funding.
A simple model of optimal allocation and implied endogeneity
Consider the problem of the optimal allocation of a fixed budget X by a central manager, across n plants. Assume the manager has complete information about the plants' characteristics and the characteristics of the production stochastic process.
Each plant i, i = 1, ... ,n is characterized by three parameters Ni, ePi, and ei all known to the manager. Plant i disposes of Ni homogeneous units of a quasi-fixed input from which it produces Di units of output. Ni is exogenously given at price zero.
17 ePi denotes the gross output-to-input ratio (ePi = D¡jN¡) which is plant specific. e¡ is a parameter that characterizes the probability that each of the Di units produced is of minimum quality in which case it is considered a success. The budget X is interpreted as a variable input to the production function, which is allocated by the central manager as a function of Ni, ePi, and e i .
The only source of uncertainty in the model is the number of successes. An example of this production technology is a batch production process, such as silicon chips. The size of the batch is the gross output given by Di, from which a fraction will be defective at the end of the production process. Call the random variable Yi E [O, Di] the number of successes (net output) from plant i. We as sume that Yi follows a binomial distribution with parameters Pi and Di. Pi represents the probability of success and is a function of the input
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The only source of uncertainty in the model is the number of successes. An example of this production technology is a batch production process, such as silicon chips. The size of the batch is the gross output given by Di, from which a fraction will be defective at the end of the production process. Call the random variable Yi E [O, Di] the number of successes (net output) from plant i. We as sume that Yi follows a binomial distribution with parameters Pi and Di. Pi represents the probability of success and is a function of the input ratio, Xi = X¡! Ni, and the efficiency parameter ei, Pi = f(Xi, ei).
The probability of success is non-decreasing in both X¡ and e i (Jx (Xi, e i ) ~ 0, fe (X¡, e¡) ~ O), and is concave in X¡. This technology exhibits constant retums to scale on the two inputs X¡ and N¡. If X¡ and N¡ are doubled, then D¡ is also doubled, implying that E (Y¡) = p¡ D¡ also doubles.
Finally, we as sume that the manager's optimization problem is to allocate the budget across plants so as to maximize the total expected net output in the firm, which can be formalized as
where X, n, f, N¡, e ¡, and D¡ for i = 1, ... ,n are all known to the central manager. Since Y¡ follows a binomial distribution, we rewrite the maximization problem as
Denoting by A the shadow value of public funds, the first-order condition when Xi > ° is af (Xi, ei) af ( Proof. dx;! dei = -(Jxe!!xx) < 0, trivial application of Roy' s identity and second-order condition. 18 D Result 1 tells us that conditional on receiving positive funding (X¡ > O) and on the concavity of the probability of success with respect to Xi, more efficient plants will have a lower input ratio then their more inefficient counterparts if their marginal productivity of success is decreasing in the efficient parameter e i . 18 The result that dx /de < o when fe > O, hinges on the assumption that he < O. The same conceptual result of lower resources (X¡) for those with the highest probability of success also holds if he > O and fe < o. We restrict the model to these two cases because the theoretical prediction matches what we observe in the data, i.e. a non-positive or even negative correlation between expenditures (or funds) per patient and success rates. To see this, suppose that the opposite is true (w.l.o.g. we analyze only one case), i.e. fe > O and he > O, tbis implies
This altemative model predicts that we should observe a positive correlation in the data between resources per capita (Xi) and success rates (j), which is not the case in our dataset. ratio, Xi = X¡! Ni, and the efficiency parameter ei, Pi = f(Xi, ei).
Denoting by A the shadow value of public funds, the first-order condition when Xi > ° is af (Xi, ei) af ( Proof. dx;! dei = -(Jxe!!xx) < 0, trivial application of Roy' s identity and second-order condition. 18 D Result 1 tells us that conditional on receiving positive funding (X¡ > O) and on the concavity of the probability of success with respect to Xi, more efficient plants will have a lower input ratio then their more inefficient counterparts if their marginal productivity of success is decreasing in the efficient parameter e i .
We have shown, in a very simple context, that a well-informed planner will optimally use its information in its allocation decision. extends this model and applies it to the OSA allocation problem assuming that OSA's objective is to maximize the number of abstinent discharged patients in the state.
Instrumental variables
Once we established the potential risk of a downward bias due to the endogeneity of Cit, we need to look for instrumental variables. Instrumental variables have to be correlated with Cit but not directly correlated with the residuals T]it in Eq. (4).
The most natural set of instruments are time durnmies (year and seasonal durnmies Y1, Y2, Y3, Q2, Q3, Q4) . These are naturally correlated with expenditures per patient because OSA makes its allocation decision annually. Furthermore, OSA pays the agencies on a quarterly basis and often makes adjustments to the amounts allocated in the form of amendments to the contracts. Contract amendments are usually the result of an unexpected increase or cut in its total budget. 19 shows that an optimal allocation model produces time dummies as the natural set of instruments for Cit. This paper also considers the number of co-dependents per patient (CODEPS) as an instrumental variable candidate. CODEPS is likely to affect expenditures since it may increase costs related to case-management, e.g. the costs of setting up a schedule convenient to all members of the family, telephone calls, cancellations, etc. Our assumption is that ít will not be directly correlated with performance but it may affect time in treatment. We will see that our results show sorne evidence of the latter effect.
The length of the contract with OSA (KYEAR) is also likely to be correlated wíth expenditures per patient since shorter contracts are usually paid by OSA on a fee-for-service basis which forces programs to cut costs or increase the number of patients to be able to break even.
Average medicaid funds per patient (MC) is a good candidate for an instrumental variable because medicaid funds are matched with OSA funds allowing for more expensive programs.
The presence of local representatives in polítical institutions at the state level may have an impact on the budget allocated to agencies within a particular region. Consequently, we created a dummy variable, LEG, which takes the value one if the agency is located in a city with a legislator or a representative in the Appropriations Committee.
Finally, we considered two variables related to the racial mix of patients (BLACK, WHITE) as instruments for Cit. These characteristics are easily observable by OSA and are likely to affect its budgeting decisions. In fact, our results show that the racial mix variables are among the best instrumental variables.
The data
Our dataset is composed of 38 contracts between OSA and agencies of alcohol abuse treatment from fiscal year 1990 through 1994. We dropped fiscal year 1990 observations from the estimations due to incompatibilities and missing values that occurred following a major change in the format of the individual patient admission and discharge forms (MATS) in Apri11990. Moreover, when MATS was introduced, programs were not forced to fill out admission forms for c1ients who were already in treatment, which could lead to sizable biases in fiscal year 1990 observations. Our dataset is an unbalanced panel due to disruption of contracts, the emergence of new providers, or simply due to missing values for certain variables.
Each contract may offer several programs on the same or different modalities. 20 Our unit of analysis is the outpatient treatment program within a contract that an agency signs with OSA.
The main data source is the MATS admission and discharge forms. These forms contain detailed information about the patient' s alcohol/drug addiction, general demographics, involvement with the law, mental health, and social environment. Although information reported in the MATS forms is self-reported, they are filled out by a clinician, which we think increases the reliability of the data.
The second data source is the contracts between OSA and each of the agencies. The typical contract states the budget for the contract year as well as the break -down of the total budget across programs.
The third data source is the quarterly financial reports submitted to OSA by the agencies for each of their contracts. These reports state income and expenditures up to the contract -quarter.
Finally, we used the monthly consumer price index for the northeast region from the Bureau of Labor Statistics to deflate expenditures.
Performance measures
In our study, we use as the performance measure one of the effectiveness indicators considered by OSA -the percentage of discharged patients from a given program in a given quarter, that are 'abstinent 30 days prior to discharge'. On an average, 72% of the discharged patients were abstinent 1 month prior to their discharge (see Table 1 ).
Measures of spending
Quarterly financial reports show how much was received from OSA and other sources (income) and how much was spent (expenditures) on the contract as a whole, up to the date of the reporto 21 Although this information has the advantage of being quarterly, and of reflecting real and not budgeted amounts, it is aggregated at the contract level instead of 20 Usually, when a contract offers two programs ofthe same modality, e.g. outpatient treatment, they differ either by site (rural versus urban) or type of patients ( adolescent, regular or elderly). In these cases we merged the data into a single observation. 21 In the data, income and expenditures are highly correlated (correlation coefficient around 0.8). We decided to use expenditures rather than income because these are more representative of the actual investment in patients. AIso, according to OSA officials, income may be seasonal or lagged. Medicaid payments, for instance, are usually made l year after expenses are incurred. from the estimations due to incompatibilities and missing values that occurred following a major change in the format of the individual patient admission and discharge forms (MATS) in Apri11990. Moreover, when MATS was introduced, programs were not forced to fill out admission forms for c1ients who were already in treatment, which could lead to sizable biases in fiscal year 1990 observations. Our dataset is an unbalanced panel due to disruption of contracts, the emergence of new providers, or simply due to missing values for certain variables.
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Quarterly financial reports show how much was received from OSA and other sources (income) and how much was spent (expenditures) on the contract as a whole, up to the date of the reporto 21 Although this information has the advantage of being quarterly, and of reflecting real and not budgeted amounts, it is aggregated at the contract level instead of 20 Usually, when a contract offers two programs ofthe same modality, e.g. outpatient treatment, they differ either by site (rural versus urban) or type of patients ( adolescent, regular or elderly). In these cases we merged the data into a single observation. 21 In the data, income and expenditures are highly correlated (correlation coefficient around 0.8). We decided to use expenditures rather than income because these are more representative of the actual investment in patients. AIso, according to OSA officials, income may be seasonal or lagged. Medicaid payments, for instance, are usually made l year after expenses are incurred. 
where AT stands for average time in treatment of the discharged cohort. The correction for AT may be important since, as can be seen in Table 1 , the average time in treatment (AT) is 125.49 days and the median is 108.19 days, which is bigger than one quarter. More than 80% of the programs spend less than US$ 1000.00 per patient under both definitions of expenditures. For current expenditures per patient, we left out of the estimation observations where expenditures per patient were aboye US$ 11,000.00 or zero. The outliers belonged to two small programs in the dataset. We deleted the whole year of data for the outlier programo
Patient characteristics data
In our cstimation, we control for discharged patients characteristics, most of which were measured at the time of the patients' admission to the programo These data are taken from the MATS forms and aggregated at the program level. Some of these variables may be c1assified as frequency of use of primary drug, severity of alcohol abuse problem, type of primary and secondary drug, marital status, professional status, intravenous drug user, etc. Most of the variables have values between [O, 1] because they represent the fraction of discharged patients who fall into a particular category. Other variables tell us an average value; for example, the variable HHINC tells us the average household income of the discharged population at the time of their admission. Table 1 provides basic descriptive statistics for relevant variables. Tables 2 and 3 show the OLS estimation results of the first-stage regression for current and accumulated expenditures per patient, respectively, with and without fixed effects. The tables only show the estimated coefficients of the sets of instrumental variables used in being disaggregated by programo This means that if a contract offers more than one program, we cannot disentangle the income received or expenditures made by each of them. To measure the expenditures made by outpatient programs, we assume that they are in accordance with the percentages stated on the contracts.
Results

The first-stage estimation
We use two altemative measures of expenditures per patient: current expenditures per patient defined by the quarterly expenditure on an outpatient program divided by the total number of patients who received treatment during that quarter and accumulated expenditures per patient, which is computed as the sum of the current expenditures per patient over the average time the discharged patients were in treatment. The formula for accumulated expenditures per patient is
Patient characteristics data
In our cstimation, we control for discharged patients characteristics, most of which were measured at the time of the patients' admission to the programo These data are taken from the MATS forms and aggregated at the program level. Some of these variables may be c1assified as frequency of use of primary drug, severity of alcohol abuse problem, type of primary and secondary drug, marital status, professional status, intravenous drug user, etc. Most of the variables have values between [O, 1] because they represent the fraction of discharged patients who fall into a particular category. Other variables tell us an average value; for example, the variable HHINC tells us the average household income of the discharged population at the time of their admission. Table 1 provides basic descriptive statistics for relevant variables. Tables 2 and 3 show the OLS estimation results of the first-stage regression for current and accumulated expenditures per patient, respectively, with and without fixed effects. The tables only show the estimated coefficients of the sets of instrumental variables used in the "production function" estimation. The tables also show goodness-of-fit statistics and an F-test of the joint significancy of the instruments used. Our baseline model is the estimation with fixed effects for which our instruments perform better as first-stage regressors, as we can see from the comparison of the P-values of the F-test, at the bottom of the tables.
Results
The first-stage estimation
For current expenditures per patient most candidates for instrumental variables are good first-stage regressors. The lowest P-value of the F-test (in Table 2 ) is obtained with the largest number of instruments.
For accumulated expenditures per patient we had more difficulty in finding good instruments. In general, the time dummies, KYEAR and CODEPS are not good predictors of accumulated expenditures per patient while the variables WHITE, BLACK, MC and LEO perform quite well.
WHITE and BLACK have a negative impact in both current and accumulated expenditures per patient. This probably reflects the negative correlation with the number of American Indians, which are concentrated in areas such as Indian reservations that may require more expensive programs.
The length of the contract with OSA (KYEAR) has a significant positive impact on both current and accumulated spending per patient probably because short-term contracts force programs to be more cost-conscious.
CODEPS also affects positively and very significantly the current spending per patient although it had no significant impact on accumulated spending per patient. We suspect this difference has to do with two distinct effects that offset each other, causing CODEPS not to be correlated with accumulated expenditures per patient. First, conditional on time in treatment, family therapy sessions involve costs that increase both current and accumulated spending. Second, it is likely that family therapy affects the patient's time in treatment and therefore the accumulated spending. For example, patients may succeed faster (decreasing the average time in treatment), and sorne of the failures may drop out later (increasing the average time in treatment). We think the net effect on the average time in treatment is negative offsetting the increase in costs per periodo Average medicaid funds per patient (MC) had no significant effect on current expenditures per patient and an almost significantly negative impact on accumulated expenditures per patient contrary to our belief. It is possible that medicaid selects providers on the basis of cost.
Surprisingly, LEO has a negative impact on both current and accumulated expenditures per patient probably because we are also controlling for another poli tic al variable, the city' s representation in the Human Resources Committee (JSTANDCR). JSTANDCR is not used as an instrument because it is also correlated with performance.
The instrumental variable estimation ofthe "productionfunction"
This subsection describes the results of the "production function" estimation. Tables 4  and 5 show the estimated C( and intercept term for the IV and OLS estimation for current and accumulated expenditures per patient, respectively. These tables also provide measures of goodness-of-fit and tests of endogeneity and overidentifying restrictions. The IV estimates reported are obtained from the standard IV estimator S = (X'Z(Z'Z)-l the "production function" estimation. The tables also show goodness-of-fit statistics and an F-test of the joint significancy of the instruments used.
Our baseline model is the estimation with fixed effects for which our instruments perform better as first-stage regressors, as we can see from the comparison of the P-values of the F-test, at the bottom of the tables.
This subsection describes the results of the "production function" estimation. Tables 4  and 5 show the estimated C( and intercept term for the IV and OLS estimation for current and accumulated expenditures per patient, respectively. These tables also provide measures of goodness-of-fit and tests of endogeneity and overidentifying restrictions. The IV estimates reported are obtained from the standard IV estimator S = (X'Z(Z'Z)-l Table 4 "Production function" estimation using current expenditures per patient and also using time dummies (TD), demographics (DM) and contract variables (CV) as instruments a 1.000 1.000 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 Table 4 "Production function" estimation using current expenditures per patient and also using time dummies (TD), demographics (DM) and contract variables (CV) as instruments a Table 5 "Production function" estimation using accumulated expenditures per patient and also using time dummies (TD), demographics (DM), contract variables (CV) and county variables (CY V) as instruments D1ALCO, D1MARI, D1METH, D1HERO, D1LSD, DlBARB, D1TRAN, F146W, F10NED, F123D, F130VD, FlONEM, F123M, F10NEW, F123W, SEVDEP, SEVINV, SEVCAS, D2ALCO, D2METH, D2MARI, RISK, HOMELESS, DEPENDNT, JAILED, PAROLE, TRIAL, VET, PSYCH, LESS12, BETW12l6, HHINCD, PRITX5, DRGAGE1, LOWSO, LOWFAM, LOWJOB, ACCTGNEW, MISACCTG, JSTANDCR, FlOMARI, FlOTRAN, FllALCO, FllHERO, FUMARI, F14HERO, F14ALCO, FlOALCO, FlOTRAN, FllCOCA and FllLSD. b D1ALCO, D1MARI, D1METH, D1HERO, D1LSD, DlBARB, D1TRAN, F146W, F10NED, F123D, F130VD, FlONEM, F123M, F10NEW, F123W, SEVDEP, SEVINV, SEVCAS, D2ALCO, D2METH, D2MARI, RISK, HOMELESS, DEPENDNT, JAILED, PAROLE, TRIAL, VET, PSYCH, LESS12, BETW12l6, HHINCD, PRITX5, DRGAGE1, LOWSO, LOWFAM, LOWJOB, ACCTGNEW, MISACCTG, JSTANDCR, FlOMARI, FlOTRAN, FllALCO, FllHERO, FUMARI, F14HERO, F14ALCO, FlOALCO, FlOTRAN, FllCOCA and FllLSD. b Z' X)-l X' Z(Z'Z)-l Zly, where Z denotes the matrix of instruments and X the matrix of regressors. 22 In our empirical model, the standard Hausman test is not suitable for testing the endogeneity of expenditures per patient because of the inexistence of an efficient and consistent estimator under the null hypothesis of exogeneity. On the one hand, the maximum likelihood estimates are not consistent due to the presence of fixed effects. On the other hand, fe asible generalized least squares (FGLS) estimates are not efficient (see Greene, 1993, p. 365) because the covariance matrix of the residuals depends on parameters that also explain the probability of success (see Eg. (6». devised an endogeneity test that does not reguire efficiency under the null. We computed the Mroz endogeneity test based on the distance between a consistent estimator under the null (the OLS estimator) and a consistent estimator under the altemative (the IV estimator).
To test the overidentifying restrictions we have used the Sargan specification test based on the correlation between instruments and residuals. 23 Table 4 shows a negative, although not significantly different from zero, marginal impact of current expenditures per patient on performance for the baseline model with fixed effects. The Sargan test does not reject the overidentifying restrictions at the 10% confidence level, and the instruments are strongly correlated with current expenditures per patient as the 10w P-values of the F-test indicate. AH sets of instruments used are good instruments, although the most solid Sargan and F-tests are obtained when aH instruments are used simultaneously. The Mroz endogeneity test does not reject the nuH hypothesis of exogeneity of current expenditures per patient. The exogeneity of funding is probably related to the rich set of regressors already included in the estimations, in particular the fixed effects. When fixed effects are not inc1uded in the estimations, we see that the fit of the regressions drops considerably and the instruments are not valido The estimates of the model without fixed effects are, therefore, shown for purposes of comparison only. We conc1ude that the impact of current expenditures per patient on performance is small and non-positive.
For accumulated expenditures per patient, Table 5 shows much more optimistic estimates. For the most part, the coefficient on accumulated expenditures per patient is now positive, although not significantly different from zero, and quantitatively small. The sets of valid 22 Although this paper does not report the results, we have also tried taking into account the heteroscedasticity of the error tenu by estimating the residual covariance matrix Q. Assuming Q to be a diagonal matrix, the estimation of the variance terms was based on the litted values from the foJlowing regression:
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Once we estimate ti = diag{~} we can derive the IV-OLS analogue and IV-GLS analogue (see . However, the estimated standard deviations of both the IV-OLS analogue and IV-GLS analogue were very large due to the low lit of the i¡f, regression which R 2 was never aboye 0.01. This result may be due to omitted variables, or heteroscedasticity in the other component of the error tenu Bit. 23 The Sargan test takes the fonu where s is the difference between the number of instruments and the number of parameters to estimate.
Z' X)-l X' Z(Z'Z)-l Zly, where Z denotes the matrix of instruments and X the matrix of regressors. 22 In our empirical model, the standard Hausman test is not suitable for testing the endogeneity of expenditures per patient because of the inexistence of an efficient and consistent estimator under the null hypothesis of exogeneity. On the one hand, the maximum likelihood estimates are not consistent due to the presence of fixed effects. On the other hand, fe asible generalized least squares (FGLS) estimates are not efficient (see Greene, 1993, p. 365) because the covariance matrix of the residuals depends on parameters that also explain the probability of success (see Eg. (6». devised an endogeneity test that does not reguire efficiency under the null. We computed the Mroz endogeneity test based on the distance between a consistent estimator under the null (the OLS estimator) and a consistent estimator under the altemative (the IV estimator).
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instruments are now different from the sets used for current expenditures per patient. In particular, time dummies are no longer strongly correlated with uccumuluted expenditures per patient and do not show a good Sargan test, as can be seen in the second column ofTable 5. WHITE and BLACK, on the other hand, perform very well as instrumental variables. The only case where the baseline model with fixed effects shows a negative coefficient on Cit is when the P-value on the Sargan test is as low as 0.113, and therefore, the instruments are somewhat more correlated with the residuals than in other cases. In all the cases, the Mroz endogeneity test does not reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the accumulated expenditures per patient. Overall, the instrumental variable approach was unable to find a positive significantIy different from zero relationship between current or accumulated expenditures per patient and performance measured in terms of fraction of abstinent discharges.
Discussion
This section discusses policy implications, caveats, options and assumptions made in this paper that we think are relevant when interpreting results.
An important limitation of this study is the restriction to a single performance measure. The traditional performance measures, based on substance consumption such as abstinence or simply reduction in consumption levels, are widely accepted as necessary for a good evaluation of a patient's performance. 24 More recentIy, other measures of performance such as reduction in criminal activities, general health, and behavior at work or school have become popular among researchers and health practitioners . In the case of a1coholics, however, abstinence as a measure of performance is a good choice since a transition to moderate drinking is usually difficult to sustain. However, it is quite fe asible that marginal dollars may have a significant positive effect in attaining other treatment goals.
Another limitation of this study is its forced reliance on performance data collected at the time of discharge from treatment, due to the inexistence offollow-up data. This will not be a source of bias if the correlation between performance at discharge and at follow-up is independent of expenditures per patient. Yet, it is reasonable to think that programs that invest more in their patients also have a stronger correlation between performance at discharge and at follow-up. This is c1early a problem that we can only hope is unimportant in this particular dataset.
Next, the use of aggregated data for the purposes of this paper is discussed at length, as well as the reasons why we think that if aggregation introduces any bias on the estimated impact of marginal funding on performance, it is more likely to be an upward bias.
FirstIy, it must be stressed that this paper does not attempt to as ses s treatment effectiveness, i.e. whether treatment improves patients' condition, which, of course, requires a patient-Ievel analysis. Secondly, it does not attempt to determine which type of patients 240ne exception to this rule is the "Harm-Reduction" movement in certain European countries (originated in The Netherlands and UK), which aims at decreasing the devastating consequences of substance abuse through, for instance, controlled consumption, needle sharing, or even liberalization of drugs, and not necessarily through the reduction of consumption and abstinence (see instruments are now different from the sets used for current expenditures per patient. In particular, time dummies are no longer strongly correlated with uccumuluted expenditures per patient and do not show a good Sargan test, as can be seen in the second column ofTable 5. WHITE and BLACK, on the other hand, perform very well as instrumental variables. The only case where the baseline model with fixed effects shows a negative coefficient on Cit is when the P-value on the Sargan test is as low as 0.113, and therefore, the instruments are somewhat more correlated with the residuals than in other cases. In all the cases, the Mroz endogeneity test does not reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the accumulated expenditures per patient.
Overall, the instrumental variable approach was unable to find a positive significantIy different from zero relationship between current or accumulated expenditures per patient and performance measured in terms of fraction of abstinent discharges.
FirstIy, it must be stressed that this paper does not attempt to as ses s treatment effectiveness, i.e. whether treatment improves patients' condition, which, of course, requires a patient-Ievel analysis. Secondly, it does not attempt to determine which type of patients 240ne exception to this rule is the "Harm-Reduction" movement in certain European countries (originated in The Netherlands and UK), which aims at decreasing the devastating consequences of substance abuse through, for instance, controlled consumption, needle sharing, or even liberalization of drugs, and not necessarily through the reduction of consumption and abstinence (see . are more cost-effective 25 but rather focuses on the performance of entire programs. This paper attempts to determine whether the marginal funding received by treatment agencies is being used to promote abstinence among their patients. This question legitimizes the use of aggregate data.
Notice that although the purpose of this paper differs from treatment effectiveness evaluation, the two ideas are linked. Treatment effectiveness matters for our results in the sense that it is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for a positive impact of funding per patient on performance. An estimate of a that is not statistically significantly greater than zero is consistent with a situation where treatment is effective but funds are inefficiently allocated, as well as with a situation where treatment is not effective at the margino The idea is that even if treatment is effective there could still be waste caused by a misuse of public money, either because of abad allocation across agencies, or abad allocation across patients within an agency, or even because the state is overfunding treatment programs in general.
This analysis is not able to determine the reason for the low value of a. The literature on substance abuse is, however, rich in studies of treatment effectiveness and overall, despite problems with many studies, has concluded that treatment is effective at least for sorne patients. A relevant study is . They use a patient-level dataset, also from outpatient programs in Maine, and ask whether more units of treatment lead to a reduction in the frequency of use of the preferred substance. Units of treatment can be regarded as an approximation to funds at the patient level, although one unit of treatment does not cost the same for all patients neither in the same programs nor across programs. They claim that there is sorne evidence of marginal treatment effectiveness for the more severe patients, although there is no marginal impact of treatment on the least severe. However, the positive effect on the more severe patients disappears when they control for the interaction of "units of treatment" with "time in treatment". This paper' s results in conjunction with the inconclusive results ofLu and McGuire raise a number of policy issues. In the first place, OSA should assess the added value (e.g. through a comprehensive cost -effectiveness study) of the outpatient drug-free treatment programs that it supports. Secondly, it should investigate whether agencies are implementing treatment adequately. And third, OSA should review and monitor agencies' expenditures to make sure that scarce public funds are not being devoted to x-inefficiencies. As an altemative to monitoring, OSA could minimize any waste by implementing incentives (such as PBC) more effectively.
Regarding the possibility of aggregation bias, we will argue that if aggregation causes any bias on the estimate of a, it is more likely that it is an upward bias. An important reference is study of the impact of aggregation in the size of omitted variables biases. Although the authors caution about the lack of a clear prediction for most models, they show in a simple two-variable model that if the omitted variables are at the same level of aggregation as the data used (e.g. in our case program characteristics or average patient characteristics), aggregation will bias estimates upwards. Furthermore, they show evidence of this effect by comparing the estimated impact of school resources on school performance 25 To study which patients are more cost-effective we would need reliable information on (at least) treatment costs at the patient leve!. Costs at the patient level can be computed from information reported in the MATS discharge forms. We have found, however, that these data are unreliable.
are more cost-effective 25 but rather focuses on the performance of entire programs. This paper attempts to determine whether the marginal funding received by treatment agencies is being used to promote abstinence among their patients. This question legitimizes the use of aggregate data.
Regarding the possibility of aggregation bias, we will argue that if aggregation causes any bias on the estimate of a, it is more likely that it is an upward bias. An important reference is study of the impact of aggregation in the size of omitted variables biases. Although the authors caution about the lack of a clear prediction for most models, they show in a simple two-variable model that if the omitted variables are at the same level of aggregation as the data used (e.g. in our case program characteristics or average patient characteristics), aggregation will bias estimates upwards. Furthermore, they show evidence of this effect by comparing the estimated impact of school resources on school performance using both data aggregated at the state level and data disaggregated to the school level. Finally, they claim that it is plausible that missing state level variables are relevant for performance since "the key policies are made at the state level".
In the case of outpatient treatment in Maine, it is also likely that the missing relevant variables are at the program level rather than at the patient level. As the more recent literature on treatment effectiveness has shown, programlagency characteristics (e.g. location, facility, staff, director, funding, staff enthusiasm and opinion about the program, treatment philosophy, etc.) are very important in explaining performance. An interesting example is study of six methadone treatment programs. Furthermore, OSA is likely to observe these relevant programlagency variables and to take them into account in the allocation decisions, which is the potential source of omitted variable (endogeneity) bias.
In addition to the arguments above, we can prove that in the context of our logistic "production function" without endogeneity, aggregation would, most likely, lead to an upward bias in the impact of funding on the average probability of success. 26 Ultimately, we think that the concem with aggregation boils down to the estimation of an average marginal effect that may overshadow large individual marginal effects. In our results, however, the estimated marginal effect is so small that if large individual marginal effects exist it must be that programs are offering counterproductive treatment to a large proportion of the patient population, which is unlikely.
Conclusions
This paper estimates the marginal impact of public funds on the abstinence rates of non-profit outpatient treatment programs for alcohol abusers in the state of Maine, from 1991 through 1994. The premise is that, given the scarcity of public funds, a marginal increase in the allocation of funds to these treatment programs should bring an increase in their performance; otherwise, the state would be better off by reallocating money to other state programs with positive marginal retums. This paper used an IV methodology to deal with the potential endogeneity of expenditures per patient. Endogeneity of expenditures is likely ifthe authorities use the funding allocation to compensate agencies for particularly hard situations, in which case programs that treat more difficult patients receive a larger allocation per patient. This paper' s results indicate that the marginal impact of expenditures per patient on the abstinence rates of outpatient programs is not significantly different from zero. More importantly, the estimates are so small that we may say that they are not economically significant. To illustrate this point, take our most reliable and optimistic estimate of ex (a = 0.0002) plus 2.5 times its standard error (i.e. a = 0.001331), this is the highest value of a that we are not able to reject at the 1 % confidence level. Next, suppose that all programs are equal to the average programo In this case, the representative program treats 79.76 patients per period, discharges 38.5 patients at the end of the period, and, on average, has 26 As an illustration, take programs 1 and 2: ajJ/ac = (a«p¡ + p2)/2)/a«c¡ + c2)/2)) = (ap¡/aC¡) + (ap2/aC2) =a¡p¡(1-p¡)+a2P2(1-P2) > max{a¡p¡(1-Pi), i = 1,2). using both data aggregated at the state level and data disaggregated to the school level. Finally, they claim that it is plausible that missing state level variables are relevant for performance since "the key policies are made at the state level".
This paper estimates the marginal impact of public funds on the abstinence rates of non-profit outpatient treatment programs for alcohol abusers in the state of Maine, from 1991 through 1994. The premise is that, given the scarcity of public funds, a marginal increase in the allocation of funds to these treatment programs should bring an increase in their performance; otherwise, the state would be better off by reallocating money to other state programs with positive marginal retums. This paper used an IV methodology to deal with the potential endogeneity of expenditures per patient. Endogeneity of expenditures is likely ifthe authorities use the funding allocation to compensate agencies for particularly hard situations, in which case programs that treat more difficult patients receive a larger allocation per patient. This paper' s results indicate that the marginal impact of expenditures per patient on the abstinence rates of outpatient programs is not significantly different from zero. More importantly, the estimates are so small that we may say that they are not economically significant. To illustrate this point, take our most reliable and optimistic estimate of ex (a = 0.0002) plus 2.5 times its standard error (i.e. a = 0.001331), this is the highest value of a that we are not able to reject at the 1 % confidence level. Next, suppose that all programs are equal to the average programo In this case, the representative program treats 79.76 patients per period, discharges 38.5 patients at the end of the period, and, on average, has a probability of success equal to 0.72. With this set of values, the average cost of obtaining one more abstinent patient in the state ofMaine is US$ 615,801.80, which is substantially greater than the average accumulated expenditures per patient of US$ 1537.80. 27 In conclusion, although the results are quite striking, we recommend further research to determine the use that treatment agencies are making of the public funds before deciding on a budget cut to alcohol abuse treatment programs, since it is possible that the marginal dollar is having a positive impact on other treatment goals that the state of Maine considers worthy of public funding. Replace the average number of patients N = 79.76, the average number of discharges D = 38.5, and the average probability of success p = 0.72, and using Ol = 0.0002 + 2.5 x 0.0004525 = 0.001331, we get n de = US$ 615,801.80. a probability of success equal to 0.72. With this set of values, the average cost of obtaining one more abstinent patient in the state ofMaine is US$ 615,801.80, which is substantially greater than the average accumulated expenditures per patient of US$ 1537.80. 27 In conclusion, although the results are quite striking, we recommend further research to determine the use that treatment agencies are making of the public funds before deciding on a budget cut to alcohol abuse treatment programs, since it is possible that the marginal dollar is having a positive impact on other treatment goals that the state of Maine considers worthy of public funding.
